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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KONAI BLOOMFIELD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020249-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION and NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery, first degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for 
aggravated robbery where the surveillance videotape showed defendant and his accomplices 
kicking and stomping the victims into unconsciousness before taking their personal property? 
The Court will only reverse a jury verdict when the evidence is "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State 
v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah App.), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998). 
2. Whether this Court should consider defendant's claim, that foundation for evidence 
was inadequate, under plain error and ineffective assistance doctrines where defendant 
positively and reasonably led the trial court to believe he was satisfied with the foundation? 
"[I]f a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting 
or has led the trial court into error, we will then decline to save that party from the [alleged 
plain] error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules, dispositive of the case, are attached at addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999); 
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Konai Bloomfield, was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery 
(R. 2-4). After a one-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of both counts (R. 51-52). 
Defendant was sentenced to two statutory five-to-life terms, to be served concurrently (R. 82-
83). Defendant appealed (R. 89-90). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this 
Court (R. 95-97). This Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the initial 
notice of appeal was not timely filed. See State v. Bloomfield, 2001 UT App 384 (R. 110-
11). The trial court granted defendant's petition for extraordinary relief and was resentenced 
(R. 99-119). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 120). The Utah Supreme Court 
2 
again transferred the case to this Court (R. 135-37). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
During the early morning of February 26,2000 Jose Farias and Gabriel Calibello were 
simultaneously assaulted by three Polynesian males at Beto's Mexican Food restaurant in Salt 
Lake City (R. 98:53, 78-81). Defendant and George Afu, one of defendant's companions, 
beat Jose unconscious (R. 98:64, 67, 109-110, 115; 2:25:59-26:24). Joe, another of 
defendant's companions assaulted Gabriel, knocking him unconscious (R. 98:57,67,98,109, 
116; 2:25:59-26:24). Defendant also tore Jose's eyebrow ring from his eyebrow, stating, 
"You won't be needing this" (R. 98:80, 126). After beating Jose unconscious, defendant 
stood over his limp body and continued to kick and stomp him while Joe searched Jose's 
pockets (R. 98:81,116,127). After beating Jose, defendant walked to Gabriel and stood by 
whileJoe searched his helpless victim's pockets and stole his wallet (R. 98:81,103,117,120, 
127). The entire incident was captured by Beto's surveillance cameras.2 
Events Leading Up to the Assault 
Jose and Gabriel had been at Rachel Redding's grandmother's house the night of 
February 25, 2000 (R. 98:71-72). The group played poker and had a few drinks (R. 98:71-
1
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1115 (Utah App. 1995). 
2
 The video was admitted at trial as State's Exhibit 1 and is cited according to its 
counter numbers, superimposed on the video image. The assault begins at 2:25:59, with 
defendant punching Jose and ends at 2:26:46, with defendant and his accomplices exiting 
the restaurant. 
3 
72). Jose and Rachel became hungry, and so the three stopped at Beto's for food some time 
before 2:00 a.m. on February 26, 2000 (R. 98:53; 110, 1:56:26). They went into the 
restaurant together and occupied a booth right behind Jose's cousins, who were at Beto's 
with their dates (R. 98:73). 
About twenty-seven minutes later, defendant's group arrived at the restaurant 
(2:23:19).3 Included in the group were George Afu (shown in the video wearing all black 
clothing), Joe (shown wearing light colored pants and a dark coat), and defendant (shown 
wearing a white t-shirt and dark pants). George entered the restaurant first, followed by 
defendant and Joe a few seconds later (R. 98:64-65,120-21; 2:23:19-30). Upon entering the 
restaurant, defendant approached Jose and asked him "what he was looking at" and why was 
Jose "looking at us like that?" (R. 98:111). The video depicts the two groups exchanging 
words (2:23:30-2:23:40). However, any conflict seemed to dissipate when George told 
Gabriel that "everything [was] fine," that they just "just wanted to come and get something 
to eat," and shook both Gabriel's and Jose's hands (R. 98:75, 98, 105,112; 2:23:35-40). 
The Assault and Robbery 
Defendant and his accomplices then moved to the counter, where they began ordering 
food (R. 98:112; 2:23:49). Less than two minutes later, Rachel and Jose arose from their 
3
 Defendant's brief contains two errors that require clarification. First, defendant 
spells Gabriel's last name, "Calvillo." Br. Aplt. at 6. However, the trial transcript 
records the correct spelling, "Calibello" (R. 98:96). Second, defendant named George as 
the individual who searched Jose's and Gabriel's pockets. Br. Aplt. at 6, 7, 25. In fact, 
Joe, not George, searched both victims' pockets (R. 98:64, 116, 126, 127). 
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table and approached the counter so that Rachel could get Jose a large Dr. Pepper (R. 98:76-
77; 2:25:27). At this instant, defendant stood at the counter ordering food while Joe and 
George stood a few steps away from the counter, flanking Rachel and Jose (R. 98:77; 
2:25:56). At the same time, Joe walked behind the table where Gabriel was seated (R. 98:98; 
2:25:59). Gabriel never saw Jose reach for anything like a weapon, as defendant later 
insinuated (R. 98:105,112). An instant later, defendant started punching Jose in the face and 
Joe, almost synchronously, began pummeling Gabriel (2:25:59; 2:26:01). Defendant grabbed 
Jose and rammed his head into the cash register, knocking it and Jose to the floor (R. 98:78; 
2:26:01-03). With Jose on the floor, defendant and George kicked and stomped Jose's face 
and head, leaving him unconscious (R. 98:80,124-25; 2:26:01-2, 26:2:26:43). During the 
beating, defendant braced himself against the back of a bench while he repeatedly stomped 
Jose's head (2:26:16). 
When George was done beating Jose, he immediately exited the store, leaving 
defendant and Joe alone with their victims (R. 98:126; 2:26:25). Just before George left, 
defendant leaned over Jose, tore out Jose's eyebrow ring, and stated, "[Y]ou won't be 
needing this" (R. 98:80,126; 2:26:22). Together, George and defendant punched Jose about 
eight times and kicked or stomped his face and head about seventeen times (2:25:59-
2:26:43). Joe punched Gabriel's face and head roughly twenty-two times (2:25:59-2:26:25). 
He then joined defendant in kicking and stomping Jose's head several more times, after 
which he searched Jose's pockets, as defendant stood over Jose's unconscious body (R. 
5 
98:81, 116; 2:26:25). After Joe searched Jose's pockets, defendant and Joe turned to the 
unconscious Gabriel, and, as defendant looked on, Joe went through Gabriel's pockets and 
stole his wallet (R. 98:81,103,120,127;2:26:46). Defendant and Joe then left the restaurant 
together (2:27:05). 
Jose's and Gabriel's Injuries 
The video clearly shows that defendant and his cohorts brutally beat their victims. 
Jose sustained multiple bruises, scrapes, and contusions to his head and face (R. 98:55; 
State's Ex.'s 3 & 4). His head bore the evidence of the stomping with tennis shoe marks (R. 
98:55). Although breathing, Jose was still unconscious when he was taken to Pioneer Valley 
Hospital and remained unconscious until sometime the next morning (R. 98:55-56,83,85). 
Gabriel, too, was beaten unconscious (R. 98:98). In fact, at trial almost eight months 
later, he still could not recall the period from the time Joe first hit him until the time he 
arrived at the hospital (R. 98:99). As a result of the beating he received, Gabriel was 
bedridden for ten days and was unable to speak for four days after the incident (R. 98:100-
01). He lost a bridge that held two false teeth and lost one of his natural teeth (R. 98:99,104; 
State's Ex. 8). He suffered a broken nose around which a bone "pok[ed] out more," which 
still hurt him at time of trial (R. 98:101). He also received a severe gash on the bottom of his 
chin that required stitches; at time of trial Gabriel's chin still it still felt numb on cold days 
(R. 98:100-01,106-07; State's Ex. 6). 
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Defendant's Story 
At trial, defendant claimed that he and his two accomplices did not enter the restaurant 
with the intent of committing an assault or a robbery (R. 98:118). He asserted that as he was 
ordering at the counter Jose was looking at him, and when he confronted Jose about it Jose 
moved as though he was reaching for a gun (R. 98:112). Defendant further asserted that he 
had been shot several times in the past and that he had once been beaten with a pool cue, 
which left him blind in his right eye (R. 98:114). Claiming that he felt threatened by Jose's 
standing on his blind side and by Jose's threatening movements, defendant felt justified in 
attacking Jose before Jose attacked him (R. 98:114-15). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The evidence, including the videotape which recorded the entire incident, was 
sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery. Defendant "took" 
possession of Jose Farias's eyebrow ring by tearing it from Jose's eyebrow after beating him 
unconscious, a sufficient "taking" under the statute. The evidence also showed that 
defendant and his two cohorts planned to rob both victims, Jose and Gabriel Calibello, by 
beating both into submission and then by taking their personal property after searching their 
pockets. The evidence also showed that defendant caused serious bodily injury by beating 
Jose into prolonged unconsciousness, an injury generally recognized as creating a substantial 
risk of death. 
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POINT II 
Defendant led the trial court to believe he was satisfied with the foundation for the 
surveillance videotape depicting the robbery. This Court should not, therefore, consider 
defendant's claim on appeal, that foundation was inadequate, whether under a plain error 
analysis or under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. In any event, foundation for 
the videotape as a genuine recording of the robbery was laid by both prosecution witnesses 
and defendant during their testimony with reference to the videotape as it was played. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WHERE THE 
SURVEILLANCE VIDEOTAPE SHOWED DEFENDANT AND HIS 
ACCOMPLICES KICKING AND STOMPING THE VICTIMS INTO 
UNCONSCIOUSNESS BEFORE TAKING THEIR PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for the 
aggravated robbery of Jose Farias. Br. Aplt. at 11-23. Specifically, defendant argues that 
the prosecution failed to prove that (1) his tearing the eyebrow ring from Jose's eyebrow was 
a "taking" under the robbery statute, (2) the act was perpetrated with the required criminal 
intent to permanently deprive Jose of his property, or (3) Jose suffered "serious bodily 
injury." Aplt. Br. at 13-15, 19-21, 21-22. Additionally, defendant argues that the 
prosecution failed to show that he was an accomplice to an attempt to take personal property 
when George searched Jose's pockets. Aplt. Br. at 16-18. Defendant's arguments are 
8 
unsupported by the plain reading of the statutes and the facts of the case. 
In reviewing a jury verdict, this Court will "view the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah 1993). The Court will only reverse a jury verdict when the evidence is 
"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah App.), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1998). 
A. The evidence presented at trial clearly established that 
defendant's tearing the eyebrow ring from Jose's eyebrow 
was a "taking" under the robbery statute. 
Defendant first asserts that "the evidence presented is not sufficient to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that there was a taking." Br. Aplt. at 14. Specifically, defendant claims 
that "[t]he evidence never demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] ever 
gained possession or control of the eyebrow ring with the purpose to deprive [Jose] of it." 
Br. Aplt. at 15. Defendant claims that he took the ring from Jose not to deprive Jose of the 
ring, but to use the ring as a weapon against Jose, who was laying unconscious on the floor. 
Br. Aplt. at 14-15. The claim is patently without merit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (a) (1999) provides that "[a] person commits robbery if 
the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of 
9 
force or fear[.]" 
The videotape, along with both Rachel Redding's and defendant's contemporaneous 
commentary about what the videotape depicted, shows that defendant "took" the eyebrow 
ring from Jose's eyebrow after he had been beaten and lay unconscious on the restaurant 
floor (R. 98:80,126; 2:26:22). Rachel testified that as defendant tore out the eyebrow ring, 
he stated, "[y]ou won't be needing this" (R. 98:80). Defendant's brutal action upon Jose's 
defenseless body, graphically portrayed by the video, belie his self-serving claims that he did 
not dispossess Jose of his personal property, that he only intended to use the eyebrow ring 
as a weapon, and that he did not act against Jose's will. Aplt's Br. at 15. See State v. 
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1988) (within the province of the jury to measure the 
credibility of defendant's testimony). 
Defendant's actions clearly constitute a "taking" under the statute, a conclusion 
supported by his own authority. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (A criminal 
taking is "[t]he act of seizing an article, with or without removing it, but with an implicit 
transfer of possession or control"); In re D.B., 925 P.2d 178,181 (Utah App. 1996) ("There 
is no 'taking" from the immediate presence of another until the victim loses the ability to 
exercise control over the property.").4 See Aplt's. Br. at 14. 
4
 See State v. Hollen, 1999 UT App 123, \ 11, 982 P.2d 90 (this Court stating, in 
reference to its ruling in D.5., "[W]e essentially equated the victim's loss of the ability to 
exercise control over the property with a taking for purposes of the robbery statute."). 
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B. Defendant has failed to preserve his specific claim that the crime of 
robbery necessarily requires that the prosecution prove that he acted 
with a "purpose to deprive," an element of theft. Additionally, defendant 
invited any error by stipulating to instructions that did not require the 
jury to find that he acted with a purpose to deprive. 
Defendant compounds his misconception of the "taking" required by section 76-6-301 
by insisting that the criminal intent prohibited by the statute requires a showing of "intent to 
permanently deprive the rightful owner of his property." Aplt. Br. at 15,19-21. However, 
defendant's view of the scope of the required "taking" within the robbery statute is not so 
much a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence as it is a legal question of statutory 
interpretation concerning the elements of the crime of robbery. Defendant failed to preserve 
this claim by raising it before the trial court. "'To preserve an issue for appeal, a party 
claiming error in the admission of evidence must object on the record in a timely fashion.'" 
State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525,537 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 
88 (Utah 1999). "'One who fails to make a necessary objection or who fails to insure that 
it is on the record is deemed to have waived the issue.'" Id. 
Moreover, defendant invited error by stipulating to an elements instruction whose 
plain language required only that the jury find that he "took or attempted to take personal 
property" and which completely omitted the alleged requirement that the jury find that 
defendant took the victim's eyebrow ring with an intent to permanently deprive him of it 
(Jury instruction 26, R. 37, 162). "The doctrine of invited error "prohibits a party from 
setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
11 
1201,1205(UtahApp. l99l)(quotmgStatev.Henderson,792P.2d5l4,5\6(Wash. 1990)); 
accord State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). The purpose of this rule is to 
discourage a defendant in a criminal case from inviting prejudicial error and then implanting 
it in the record "as a form of appellate insurance against an adverse sentence." State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1285 (Utah 1989), habeas corpus denied by Parson v. Galetka, 57 
F.Supp.2d 1151 (1999). See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,1022-23 (Utah 1987) (declining 
to review a challenge to a jury instruction stipulated to by defense counsel at trial under 
invited error doctrine). 
Because defendant both failed to raise his challenge to the required elements for 
robbery and invited any error by approving jury instructions that embraced a theory contrary 
to that raised on appeal, this Court should decline to consider his claim. 
C. The manner of committing a robbery under which defendant was charged 
does not require that the prosecution prove that defendant took the 
victim's property with an intent to permanently deprive him of i t 
Even if defendant had preserved his claim at trial, it fails on the merits. "When 
interpreting a section of the Utah Code, we are guided by the principle that a statute is 
generally construed according to its plain language. Only if we find ambiguity in the statute's 
plain language need we resort to other methods of statutory interpretation." State v. 
Thurman, 911 P,2d 371,373 (Utah 1996); State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, J45,989 P.2d 
1091 ("'We assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words 
are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable/") (citation 
12 
omitted). 
The plain language of section 76-6-301(1) (a), set out in Part 3 of the criminal code 
providing for "Robbery" requires, in pertinent part, only that the criminal defendant 
"unlawfully and intentionally take[] or attempt to take]] personal property in the possession 
of another from his person . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1) (a) (1999) (emphasis 
added). In contradistinction, Part 4 of the criminal code, providing for the offense of 
"Theft" expressly limits the definitions contained in that part of the code to the offense of 
theft.5 Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1999), provides: 
For the purposes of this part: 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a 
period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial 
portion of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, 
would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or 
other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the express limitation of section 76-6-401 to theft, defendant, 
imports that offense's mens rea variant, that the actor have the intent to permanently 
withhold property, into the definition of "take," required for robbery. As discussed above, 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), provides: "A person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof." 
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the definition of "take" does not contain any necessary connotation that "taken" property be 
permanently withheld. 
Two lines of reasoning and authority support the foregoing conclusion. First, 
subsections (1) (b) and (2) of 76-6-301, unlike subsection (1) (a), expressly incorporate by 
reference into the offense of robbery actions taken in the course of committing a theft. 
Specifically, section 76-6-301 provides: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of committing a 
theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
Since the legislature has expressly provided in the above-referenced subsections for 
one mode of committing robbery that fully embraces actions taken in the course of 
committing a theft, it is reasonable to assume that it did not intend to needlessly recapitulate 
the same requirements in subsection (l)(a). State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 278 (Utah 
App. 1995) ("Because we assume every word in the statute was chosen advisedly by the 
Legislature, we resist concluding it would have chosen redundant language."). Rather, it is 
plain that the legislature was broadening the statute to reach culpable conduct apart from that 
constituting a theft. 
14 
Additionally, persuasive authority suppoi Is Ihr \n « llui ilr|M.'inliii^ mi 111*1 Jiiliml" i 
v. Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1980), cert denied, Carter \ United States, 450 V S r " " 
101 S f t 1375 (1981). the defendant attempted a bank robber / tor the stated purpose of 
-
n
 apprehenocJ ai,,, . t u r n e d li ||' inisoii mllia lluui stealing u bank's ile 
• • *- • * ^113faV t^e federal bank robbery statute, which 
Lxvw wioh's robbery statute, required only a "taking," Id. at 1278.6 That section provides, in 
jHTlinent part;, that "wjhoever, by force and violence . , *~1— ,he person or 
t he Tenth Circuit held: 
We believe that an individual who enters a bank with the intention of 
taking money by intimidating employees of the bank, is answerable for the 
consequences of his actions even assuming his motive for committing the 
act was to be caught and returned to prison. The fact that the bank was to be 
deprived of the funds only temporarily does not change the result [Emphasis 
added.] 
Id. at 1279. Interestingly, 18 U.S.C.§ 2113(b), like Utah 's robbery statute, also contains a 
second variant of bank robbery, which makes culpable the conduct; of an actor w ho "takes 
and carries away [property in the care of a bank] with intent to Meai I .H I L'vi ' v ,; I I \ n; li i 
U > S - 255, 120 S. Ct. 2159 (2000), wherein the United States Supi eme Court affirmed the 
6
 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), -(b) have not been amended since Lewis was issued. * v, 
U . S . C § 2113 (2000) (historical and statutory notes). 
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conviction of a bank robber charged under section 2113 (a) without requiring a showing of 
intent to steal. Approving Lewis, the Court found the offense under section 2113(b) not to 
be a lesser included offense of bank robbery under section 2113(a) because the former 
offense contained the additional element of intent to steal. Id. at 269,120 S. Ct. at 2168-69.7 
Defendant cites no persuasive authority that robbery requires an intent to permanently 
deprive. Defendant mistakenly cites State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) in support of his claim. Aplt. Br. at 19. However, the phrase "permanently 
deprive" does not appear in any part of that decision. Defendant also cites three cases from 
other jurisdictions, see e.g., Crawford v. Commonwealth, 231 S.E.2d 309, 310 (Va. 1977); 
State v. Hudson, 206 S.E.2d 415,419 (W. Va. 1974); mdState v. Lawrence, 136 S.E.2d 595, 
599-600 (N.C. 1964), which variously assert that a taking with "intent to steal" or to 
"permanently deprive" an owner of property is an essential element of robbery at common 
law. Aplt. Br. at 19. However, those cases relying on the common law are inapplicable in 
Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1999) ("Common law crimes are abolished and no 
conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance."). 
In sum, defendant is mistaken that in order to prove robbery the prosecution was 
required to show that he intended to permanently deprive Jose of his property. Rather, it was 
7
 But see State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 n.l (Utah 1983) (asserting that "'purpose to 
deprive' is inherent in the act of robbery in view of the manner of taking specified in § 
76-6-30"). The assertion in Hill, however, is dicta with respect to the defendant's claim 
in this case because the court expressly limited its holding to the facts of the case, facts 
which showed that the defendant did indeed commit a theft by taking property. Id. 97-98. 
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5
 • necessary to show that defendant took the property, the operative element of robbery as 
m the information (R. 2). 
D. In any event, the evidence proved defendant's 
"purpose to deprive" the victim of his personal pi c pei it) 
Ill' \ ni i f this I "oiiil wrrr to find that a "purpose to deprive" is an essential element of 
i obbery, that element, with respect to defendant's taking Jose's eyebrow ring, was satisfied 
in this case, As an alternative to shorn me that an actor w ithheld property permanently, the 
prosecution i na> pi o\ e a pui pc ing that an 
object ''[t]o dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlif *. ' Mat the ou ner 
w ill recover it." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3) (c) (1999). 
Tli 3 undisputed evidence is that defendant tore the . . n i^ i r ) >« . v ^ w 
when defendant h.id 1'ifiislicd bcaling 
w. 'hen he pi llled the eyebrov ring out, he immediately threw it back at Jose (R. 98.12(J). 
I here was no evidence that the eyebrow ring was ever recovered, and even if defendant did 
tlii o w the eyebrow ring back at Jose, the circumstances made it unlikei> that ..o^e would 
recovu ill I liinr uleolupc1 |il mil shon . I In ill luist mil i i i In infil u ic Hit mil inn onsui n< 
(2:26:22). Rachel was obviously so distraught that she apparently lacked the presence of 
n tin i to attend to her disabled friends for several minutes after defendant and his cohorts, left 
In response to whether he had-walked out of the restaurant with the eyebrow 
--- ~ defendant answered negatively, all of which might reasonably have suggested to an 
mcredulous jury that defendant actually stole the nn<? fl* OS* 1 ?8-29) 
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the restaurant (2:27:05-31:26). In the videotape, customers are seen leaving the restaurant, 
walking through the area in which Jose lies, and Beto's employees scamper behind the 
counter, all without assisting the unconscious victim (2:27:05-31:26). Jose never regained 
consciousness in the restaurant (R. 98:55-56, 83, 85). In these circumstances, a jury would 
reasonably have concluded that defendant disposed of the eyebrow ring in circumstances in 
which Jose would not likely have recovered it.9 
E. The evidence graphically shows that defendant, George, and 
Joe acted as accomplices in beating the victims and in either 
taking or attempting to take their personal property. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he acted as an 
accomplice in attempting to take personal property from Jose. He claims instead that he was 
merely present when Joe went through Jose's pockets, insisting that he merely patted Jose 
down to make sure he did not have a weapon. See Aplt. Br. at 16-19. The videotape belies 
defendant's characterization of the entire episode. 
"Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense 
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aides another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct." Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1999). "While 
9
 The jury would not have considered this alternative means of finding defendant 
guilty of robbery because "purpose to deprive" was not presented as an element of the 
offense. However, the State should not be denied the opportunity to argue this alternative 
theory since defendant invited any error in stipulating to instructions that omitted this 
alleged element. 
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minr [HC'SHHT <il Ihc scene of a crime affords no basis for a conviction, presence, 
companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from, which one's 
participation in the criminal-intent may be inferred.' "" American F ork L >;. . ;„../„ 
App 1" /1)\, Il 1 II1 1 ION «n ml, linns oi lulled) I liniliiiij llii" IcfciKll.inl 's pic di'u a ,il I he i nr in 
led principal actor's theft). See also State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 
30,36 (Utah App. 1996) (finding the defendant's presence inside the store, albeit musi J< ''a-
N'hHii in which his companion sexually assaulted the v ictim, was to prevent intci it:reno Jn 
his accomplice's offense). 
lint addition to arguing that defendant was culpable for aggravated robbery as a 
piiiicipal in beating Jose and taking his eyebrow ring, the prosecution also argued at length 
losing that defendant was culpable as a party for the aggravated robberies < 
*nv. ,...•>: iC. i~ "i «*lfola[»f I mi llliiii (iJiii'i IIIKI piosaulm riif• iita«I III ill 
*^-'
M
 defendant and his two cohorts entered the restaurant 
and that the attacks on Jose and Gabnti win plainly coordinated to incapacitate both victims 
11ml ihcn rob them, (R. 98:136-39), Pointing to Count I specifically, the prosecutor argued 
that even though delenda1 " • • i• • nn| jjn !"«M (ill 11>s^  '" pni k"!1 hmwcM VV WA\ IM ' 
i ^ .*s a party, based on defendant's and his cohort's coordinated action (R. 98:139 . v / . 
He fur her argued that defendant particularly aided Joe, who was going through ^ ^ ' • 
pockets -\ simultaneously Ikn king Jose (R (JK.I40| In accord with Ihe prosecun 
-. :ourl inslnielal the |!iii * HI iiu,.om|>lu:<* liahihl IJIIIIIII ' In ,lmi In HI ..'I, V 'I'I 'i,' | 
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The videotape and trial testimony support the prosecution's argument. The videotape 
contains a segment that shows with graphic force that the aggravated robberies of both Jose 
and Gabriel were preplanned. As defendant stands at the counter with Jose immediately 
behind him, Joe, who purportedly is also ordering food, leaves the counter and walks behind 
the table where Gabriel is seated (R. 98:98; 2:25:55-59). An instant later, defendant and 
George start punching Jose in the face, and, as if on cue, Joe begins pummeling Gabriel 
(2:26:00). The almost perfect synchronicity of the attacks at dispersed points and without 
any apparent provocation from either victim compellingly demonstrate that the attacks were 
planned before defendant and his friends entered the restaurant. This impression is 
reinforced by defendant and his cohorts keeping Jose and Gabriel under their continuously 
watchful their eyes before the attack, as though they were actively readying themselves for 
the assault (2:23:27-25:58). 
When viewed as the outcome of a previously prepared plan, all of defendant's 
subsequent actions become recognizable as efforts to "encourage" or "aid" his cohorts in 
committing the robberies: (1) defendant's beating Jose unconscious aided Joe in beating 
Gabriel by preventing Jose from interceding to protect his friend (2:26:00-22); (2) 
defendant's kicking Jose both aided and encouraged Joe as Joe searched Jose's pockets 
(2:26:30-43); (3) defendant's standing over Joe while Joe searched Gabriel's pockets and 
stole his wallet was a form of encouragement (2:26:46-56). Furthermore, Rachel testified 
that when Joe went through Jose's pockets, she "assumed that they were looking for money 
20 
* • .
 ;
- ipt' III.IIMIN .11 inin.11 i i l irlrii i l.i i i l l iinl lor w orkinp in 
uiiiiuii to beat and in^u i^u men victims. 
I , From the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Jose's injuries constituted serious bodily injury. 
Defendant argues that Iht euJeihc pn ^eiilnl ml linil i,\,„is nisullii mil li. •, i|ip<nl Id 
*• - iacted ," ;sei ious bodily injun "] on Jose, as 
i equired to prove aggravated robber) Specificall) , defendant clairns that "\ vhen Depi it) 
I In lggard arrived at the restaurant, Jose was unconscious and that Jose displayed only scrapes 
and bruises, none of which constituted "serious bodily ni|iirv "" III Apll .it 22. 
As definnl h \ iljlulc, ,i person romnnts aggravated i hhery il "in the course of 
committing robbery, he: . . .
 vb) causes sei ious bodily injury upon another." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1) (1999) "Serious bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury that creates or 
causes serious permanent disfigurement, pu . : • o*impairmem e tuncuon oi any 
bodilj membe i c i :: i gan. :)i i - , . - . . -
60-1(10) (1999). , . . • 
I Jnder section 76-1-601, Jose clearly suffered serious bodily injury by being subject 
to "a substantial risk ol death I he snleulapc depuL defendant Jiull Geo^n IIIIII ills 
beatini' lost; fir si I" »' liimmm}.' his hiNid into a cash rcpistoi, sending it to the floor (2:26:01), 
• uetenaani aiso argues at Point II of his brief that because he w as not inv olved in 
beating Gabriel and was, at most, merely present as Joe searched Gabriel, the evidence of 
accomplice liability was insufficient to support his aggravated robbery conviction, of 
Gabriel (Count II), Aplt. Br. at 23-29, The foregoing argument fully answers this claim. 
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and then by repeatedly punching, kicking, and stomping his head and face, leaving him 
unconscious (2:25:59-26:24). Defendant and George punched Jose roughly 8 times and 
kicked or stomped Jose's face and head roughly 17 times. Chillingly, defendant even used 
a bench for leverage as he jumped up and down on Jose's head (2:26:16). Deputy Huggard 
testified that when he arrived on the scene Jose was unconscious on the floor and had 
numerous bruises, scrapes, and contusions on his head (R. 98:55,56). The deputy stated that 
Jose never regained consciousness while he was at the restaurant and that he considered him 
to be in "critical or nearly critical condition" (R. 98 55-56). Rachel testified that she visited 
Jose in the hospital and believed that he only regained consciousness sometime the next 
morning (R. 98:85). 
Jose's prolonged unconsciousness, stemming from the brutal beating he received, 
constitutes a "substantial risk of death," and therefore, "serious bodily injury," virtually as 
a matter of law. In State v. Peterson, the defendant choked the victim, causing her to black 
out, and he was charged with aggravated assault in using "such means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Utah 
1984).11 The Utah Supreme Court held that although the victim suffered no permanent 
11
 Utah Code Ann. 76-5-103 (1999), provides: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined 
in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
22 
disfigi - >-' * •• * •• . -\ the force defendant applied "could have 
caused the [Mctun *} death. Id. See also Sure w Poteet, 692 P 2d 76i) "64 (Utah 1984) 
'Hud*^; evidence sufficient in aggravated assault conviction where victim Uiu not regain 
consciousness toi 1 > In IK hums .illn the assault and! atltiidnig ph>siuun lestihnl MI liiiiii 
liiiiii!! n n l m l ) tfiiih) i I mttulStntrs nS4 A ?d(M '" <i| m J) f "Mil If) H evidence sufficient 
to prove serious bodily injur}'" where victim testified that he was "semi-unconscious," "in 
total shock," and "not totally coherent" after the assault, photographs revealed deep cuts 
aroun. ..amsnose a .. * M I»" J \ S 2d 
- - ,•* -st^ KhcK • ment of serious physical injury 
.. J J the victim unconscious ti s as a result ofhis choke hold 
and expert testified that the type of choking capable of causing a loss of consciousness posed 
a substantial i isk of death), Indeed, prolonged unconsciousness ts leaigiiiiynll its «»i sri i iii« 
Sec t ion 7 6 - 1 - 6 0 1 or o the r m e a n s oi h u a h k r l \ l u p u M l u u 1 
death or serious bodily injury. 
' I he section was amended in 1995, adding "under circumstances not amounting to 
a violation of Subsection (l)(a)" to the beginning of Subsection (l)(b)," I Jtah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (1999) amendment notes. Thus, the amendment more clearly distinguishes 
"serious bodily injury" from "force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." 
However, from 1984, when Peterson was decided, section 76-1-601, has consistently 
defined "serious bodily injury" to be "bodily injury that creates or causes , , . a substantial 
risk of death." Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1218; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1999). Indeed, 
defendant's contention that, "at most, the evidence satisfies proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the offense of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, was committed, and 
appellant's conviction should be reduced accordingly," see Aplt. Br. at 23, is almost a 
concession ofhis substantive claim. 
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a bodily injury, that other jurisdictions have incorporated that condition, in addition to injury 
that creates a risk of death, into their "serious bodily injury" statutes.12 Utah case law, in 
addition to such widespread statutory equation of unconsciousness with serious bodily injury, 
makes clear that evidence of Jose's prolonged unconscious was sufficient to prove that 
defendant inflicted serious bodily injury. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY LED THE TRIAL 
COURT TO BELIEVE THAT THE FOUNDATION FOR THE 
VIDEOTAPE WAS SATISFACTORY, THIS COURT SHOULD 
DECLINE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR OR THAT HIS 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ALLOWING THE VIDEOTAPE 
TO BE ADMITTED 
Defendant argues that it was plain error for the trial court to admit the videotape 
evidence because the State failed to lay a proper foundation for its admission. Specifically, 
defendant argues that the foundation was inadequate because the State's witnesses failed to 
12
 Brief research uncovered three jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, Indiana, 
and Tennessee, that have defined "serious bodily injury" to include some level of 
unconsciousness, in addition to injury that causes a substantial risk of death. See D.C. 
Code 1981 § 22-3202(7) ("'Serious bodily injury5 means bodily injury that involves a 
substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious 
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, 
organ, or mental faculty."); Ind. Code § 35-41-1-25 ("Serious bodily injury" is defined as 
'bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, unconsciousness, extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ.'"); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 39-11-106 (a)(34) 1997) ("Serious bodily injury" involves "(A) [a] substantial risk of 
death; (B) [protracted unconsciousness; (C) [extreme physical pain; (D) [protracted or 
obvious disfigurement; or (E) [protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a 
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty."). 
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sprnfit all'1 st,ili III ml tin1 \ iiileotfipc . i rn imt rh i . " "" :" •• 
because Deputy Huggai d, tin ough whose testimon) i;iw ..Jcutape was introduced, did noi 
personally witness the events. Aplt. Br. at 30. Defendant also claims that his trial counsel 
was ineltective in tailing to objecl to the admission of the videotape. Aph hi JI I I (n " 
III h)\\ HI ibis ( omit JinHilnf flnrliiiiiii h nisiiln dda idan l ' • r i um^ IH^HHM' ln» iiffiinuidn, i k 
and
 reasonably led the trial court to believe that he was satisfies i-dation laid for 
the admission of the videotape. 
To establish plain error,, a defendant ^ ^ an error e> .. m^r 
"Jh(injiiId1 hai re hrn Illi'i iiiiiii 1 Illif l i inl i nil ill 
850 p.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). However, "a defendant "'cannot lead the court into 
error by failing to object and then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit b> his 
instruction and then claiming manifest injustice on -»Te-- * his Court stated: 
Under the guidance of [Utah R. C ^ ' ~ * ~ [ 7e been very reluctant to 
13
 In connection with both his claims of plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant cursorily asserts that the improper admission of the videotape denied 
him his right of confrontation under the state and federal constitutions. Aplt. Br at 33 
35. Because defendant has merely mentioned these claims, without developing any 
supporting argument, the Court should decline to consider them. "It is well established 
that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State 
i> Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Fareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 
(I Jtah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where defendant's brief "wholly lacked legal 
analysis and authority to support his argument")). 
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review . . . matters not preserved for appeal by means of an objection at trial 
In State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987), we declined to review a 
challenged jury instruction under the manifest error exception to rule 19(c) 
even though, in retrospect, the instruction seemed ill-advised. We noted that 
the defendants counsel consciously chose not to object and "affirmatively led 
the trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong with the instruction." Id. 
at 1023. 
Mat 1108-09. 
In State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court refused to 
consider the merits of a plain error claim because counsel's failure to object was a strategic 
decision, rather than an oversight constituting ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 158-
60. The Court stated, "If the decision was conscious and did not amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel, this Court should refuse to consider the merits of the trial court's 
ruling." Id at 159. 
"To bring a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 'a defendant must show 
that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness," and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial.'" 
State v. Galleon, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 
578,579 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. ^a^mgto«,466U.S.668,688,104S.Ct. 
2052, 2064 (1984))). However, "[t]he failure of counsel to make motions or objections 
which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 
1999 UT 96,1f34, 989 P.2d 52 (citations omitted). 
Foundation for evidence is provided by rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, which 
26 
states: 
(a) General provision I he requirement of authentication or identification as 
a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
r>: i i i ustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the 
rollowing are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the 
-•^'^rements of this rule: 
cdiiiiiony of witness with '.knowledge. Testimony that a 
„u..er is what it is claimed to be. [Emphasis added.] 
TTtahR Evid 901. 
I l l l l l l lS C d S I ll< i 
believe that hi w • Mtisfled with the foundation iaiu the .ideoiapc, 
State's exhibit 1 (R. 57). Preliminary to having the videotape admitted, Deputy Huggard 
ified that he had investigated the robbery at Beto's and that a diagram, States exhibit 1, 
was a true and accurate rcpreseuUiluiii nil Iklnn s mill iiiiiii I P" SJ VI | Ilk alLm testified llliiiiil 
mp|nve»'s tnU l»ii"i iliiji tlti" entire incident had been captured on the restaurant' s 
T . JC^ surveillance system and that he had located the > ideotape (R. 98:60). When the 
I iui rr.reutor sought to introduce the videotape through Deputy Huggard1 s testimony, defense 
unum »dl assailed I Hunk In needs In p.vl ill .iitliiiillcd iiiiill hi, .1 pinper Iniiinlitlinii il IP OS In11 
j n reSponse to counsel's request, the prosecutor elicited the following foundational testimonj 
fi om Deputy Huggard as the videotape was played: 
(1) the videotape then being played was the videotape thai he retrieved 
the night of the robber)/ (R , QR-fi4V 
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(2) each of the four split screens depicted on the videotape corresponded 
to specific views of Beto's interior, depicted on the diagram, State's 
exhibit 2 (R. 98:63-64); 
(3) Deputy Huggard identified persons on the videotape "as he knew them 
to be," - - George Afu, Joe, and defendant, as they walked through the 
restaurant door (R. 98:64-65); 
(4) Deputy Huggard identified Jose, Gabriel, and Rachel, the last of whom 
he spoke with the night of the robbery (R. 98:65-66); and 
(5) the videotape accurately showed the positions in which he found Jose 
and Gabriel (R. 98:67). 
At the conclusion of Deputy Huggard's testimony, the prosecutor moved to admit the 
videotape. Defense counsel immediately responded, "No objection" (R. 98:67). 
In light of the foregoing testimony, it is plain that defense counsel was concerned with 
the sufficiency of the foundation for the videotape, considered the deputy's testimony, 
concluded that the testimony was adequate to support the admission of the videotape, and 
signaled to the trial court his assent to its admission. It is equally apparent that the 
foundation was sufficient under rule 901 because the deputy could affirm that what the 
videotape depicted was consistent with his first hand experience, even though he was not a 
witness to the robbery itself.14 In these circumstances, any objection by the defense would 
14
 The events depicted in the videotape were also substantially corroborated by the 
testimony of both Rachel and defendant. With reference to the videotape as it played, 
Rachel corroborated each and all of the principal actions taken by Jose, defendant, 
George, Joe and herself (R. 98:75-81). In particular, she identified defendant and his 
accomplices as they entered the restaurant, their kicking and punching Jose, that a couple 
of men searched Jose's pockets, and that after the incident she attempted to use Beto's 
telephone to call 911 all of which was depicted in the video (R. 98:75, 80-81, 83-84). 
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Iihn c lii'ii'ii hihlc ami *m\ IMTOI JIU nut have been obvious to the trial court. Therefore, this 
court need not consider the merits of defendant's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based tHI llic loregouiy IJISUISMOII lllii1 SLilc it'spoi lliillh irnpicsi Ihil lidnidaiil" . 
I MM V III ( H i l l s he , ' » H i m i m l ' • 
RESPECTF ULL i N L bMITTED this JH day of June, 2002 
Assistant Attorney General 
While viewing the videotape, defendant pro\ ided an accurate and corroborative 
narration, of the video under cross examination and not once did he dispute its contents 
Defendant readily admitted to asking Jose "'Hey what [was he] looking at?" (R 98 I 211 
He admitted assaulting Jose and kicking him multiple times (R. 98:125). He admitted 
that he stood by while Joe searched Jose's pockets (R. 98:127), Defendant admitted 
during direct examination that he contacted a lawyer once he found out that he had been 
caught on camera (R. 98:118). Finally, defendant admitted that only after he found out 
had been caught on camera did he contact a lawyer (R. 98:118). In sum, defendant's 
testimony constitutes an implied authentication of the videotape. See State v. Hygh, 711 
P.2d 264, 270 (Utah 1985) (under the so-called "silent witness theory," evidence "speaks 
for [itself] and constitute^] independent, substantive evidence of what [it] portrayfs], 
independent of a sponsoring witness."). 
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were mailed to Ronald J. Yengich and Vanessa Ramos-Smith, Yengich, Rich & Xaiz, 
attorneys for defendant, 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this _[3_ -K 
day of June, 2002. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76»M0& Common law crimes abolished. 
Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime "">*« made so 
by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance. 
76-1401. Definition*. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in 
a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury* means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct* means an act or omission 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor repreeents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense* means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission* means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person* means an individual, publk or pira 
ment, partner1^^ or "TV**"* W I M W **+A association. 
(9) "Possess* means to have physical possession (rf or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury* means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement! protracted loee or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
(U) "Substantial bodily injury9 means bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury; that crestes or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the flinction 
of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing* or "written* includes any handwriting, typewriting, 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(DA person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(lXa), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily iiyury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony. 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if. 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means offeree or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immedi-
ate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to conunit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery, 
(1) A person commita aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
—«il|luifif VIA* 
(a) usee or threaten* to use a dangerous weapon aa defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another, or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be *;in the 
course of committing a robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
76-6-401. Definition*. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) 'Property* means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, 
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights 
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise contain-
ing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature 
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade 
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical 
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the 
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain* means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another, in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof, and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive* means to have the conscious object 
(a) Tb withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof would be lost; or 
(b) Tb restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) lb dispose of the properly under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover i t 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement 
(5) "Deception* occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a folse impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe 
to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without 
disclosing a lien, security interest adverse claim, or other legal 
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not 
a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promisee performance that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not 
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend 
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed 
76-6-404 Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identifica-
tion* 
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as 
a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only; and not by way of limitation, 
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with 
the requirements of this rule: 
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it 
is claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genu-
ineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the 
litigation. 
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier of fact or 
by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated. 
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction 
with circumstances. 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or 
through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based 
upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the 
alleged speaker. 
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a 
call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company 
to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, 
including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or 
(B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a place of business and the 
conversation related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be 
recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported 
public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the 
public office where items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a document or 
data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion 
concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would 
likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is 
offered. 
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to 
produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate 
result 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or 
identification provided by court rule or statute of this state. 
